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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
The Feminist Movement of the 1960's seems to have 
been the impetus for much research concerning the dif-
ferences between females and males, sex-roles, and sex-
role stereotypes. In over 600 pages Maccoby and Jacklin 
(1974) provide an excellent summary of the myriad scho-
larly studies conducted just since:1966. Differences 
between the sexes in terms of intellect and achievement, 
socialization, sex-typing, and social behavior are but a 
few of the topics covered. Chafetz' Masculine/Feminine 
or Human? (1974) is devoted entirely to the exploration 
of sex roles in our society. Baird (1976) has recently 
provided a comprehensive summary and review of research 
relating to sex differences in small group communication. 
Coincidentally, another body of literature has 
emerged which applies human relations principles to the 
female-male relationship. Examples of such works are: 
Patton and Patton's Living Together (1976), O'Neill and 
O'Neill's Open Marriage (1972), and Masters and Johnson's 
The Pleasure Bond (1974). One variable that has been 
recognized by these authors as being of central impor-
tance in the female-male relationship is trust. O'Neill 
1 
and O'Neill, for example, devote an entire chapter to 
this communication variable (pp. 221-235). 
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Aside from the specific context of the female-male 
relationship, trust is also consistently recognized by 
communication scholars as a variable of central impor-
tance in all contexts of human communication. Johnson 
(1972) flatly states, "Little happens in a relationship 
until the individuals learn to trust each other" (p •. 43). 
After more than twenty years of studying T-groups 
and problem-solving (i.e. task) groups, Jack Gibb has 
concluded that trust is the pacemaker variable in group 
growth. Trust among members is necessary fo~ a group of 
two, ten, or fifteen members in order to develop an 
adequate feedback and data-processing system, to establish 
and integrate goals, and to develop a feeling of inter-
dependence or mutual influence among group members (Gibb, 
1964; Gibb and Gibb, 1974). The most important element 
in Rogers' client-centered therapy is an atmosphere of 
psychological safety. That is, the client feels safe and 
thus, trusts the therapist as a listener when she/he 
behaves in a manner th~t displays genuineness, nonpossessive 
warmth and accurate empathy (Rogers, 1961). Kim Giffin, 
who has made major contributions to the study of inter-
personal trust, has concluded: 
After having researched the construct from its 
earliest form to ·its latest advocates, after 
having conducted many groups of students who 
profess to have low trust of their own and others• 
communicative behaviors, we are more convinced 
than ever that the central construct for 
good interpersonal relations is trust.· 
(Giffin and Barnes, 1976, p. 9) 
This author equally convinced of the importance 
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of trust in interpersonal relationships. Trust seems to 
be a prerequisite to sharing parts of ourselves or self-
disclosing, which in turn, is necessary for establishing 
and maintaining human relationships. Specifically, trust 
is necessary and concomitant to the self-disclosure which 
is essential for establishing and maintaining the female-
male relationship. Yet, we have little empirical evi-
dence of how trust operates as a communication variable 
between the sexes. We do not know to what extent, if any, 
females and males bring similar or dissimilar attitudes 
of trust to encounters with members of the same or 
opposite sex. 
In order to explore the relationship between inter-
personal trust and communication between the sexes, it is 
necessary first to provide a conceptual framework for 
studying the construct of interpersonal trust, and also 
a method for measuring it. Three such conceptual frame-
' 
works and measuring instruments are available as possible 
means of exploring this relationship. The following is 
a review of these approaches to the study of interpersonal 
trust. Special attention will be given to any findings 
related to differences or similarities between females 
and males. 
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Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale: 
Theoretical Perspective and Relevant Research 
Julian Rotter (1967) defines interpersonal trust as 
11 ••• an [generalized) expectancy held by an individual or 
a group that the word, promise, verbal or written state-
ment of another individual can be relied upon" (p. 651). 
This definition of interpersonal trust is derived from a 
social learning theory perspective. A social learning 
theory orientation assumes that the individual expects 
certain outcomes from behavior due to promised positive 
or negative reinforcement in the past. Thus, the behavior 
and statements of parents, teachers, peers, and other 
trusted sources result in our learning to trust or dis-
trust others. Trust is thus viewed as a "generalized 
expectancy," and this expectancy is said to differ for 
individuals due to differing past experiences. Rotter 
constructed the Interpersonal Trust Scale in an effort 
to adequately measure individual differences in genera-
lized trust of others. 
The Interpersonal Trust Scale (henceforth, ITS} is 
a 25-item (with an additional 15 filler items}, Likert-
type scale. On the basis of two estimates of test-
retest reliability which were significant, Rotter (1967) 
argues that the ITS is a stable (i.e. reliable) measuring 
instrument. The correlations were significant: • 56 and 
. 6 8 (p <. • 01) , but not unusually high'. Also, sample sizes 
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for retest were rather small: 24 and 34 subjects for 
each. These are the only two tests for reliability 
reported by Rotter or other researchers, and thus, it 
does not seem to this writer that reliability of the ITS 
has been demonstrated conclusively. Rotter (1967) also 
reports a sociometric study conducted with two frater-
nities and sororities which included the use of the ITS 
to determine its construct and discrimination validity. 
Combined intercorrelations of sociometric and test scores 
again yielded rather low, but statistically significant 
results. For example, the correlation between the ITS 
and sociometric trust was . 3 7 (p < . 01) • 
In checking demographic data for 547 college students 
who took the ITS, Rotter found no significant differences 
in scores due to sex, age, or number of semesters of 
college attended. ITS scores were related significantly 
to position in the family, socioeconomic level, religion, 
and religious differences between parents. 
Since Rotter's initial publication, the ITS has been 
widely used as a tool to measure the relationship between 
interpersonal trust and other variables. For.example, 
in a correlational study, Massari and Rosenblum (1972) 
found a significant positive relationship between inter-
nality, the expectancy that one is in control or instru-
mental in achieving success or failing (as measured by 
Rotter's locus of control scale), and interpersonal 
trust. Trust and internality were negatively related to 
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academic achievement (as measured by final examination 
grades in an introductory psychology course) for women, 
and unrelated to academic achievement for men. The 
authors' hypothesis that high trust would be related to 
academic achievement was based on the assumption that 
given a high general expectancy to believe the statements 
of others, those students would accept statements of pre-
sumed fact from their instructors. Accepting statements 
of &act and remembering statements on a final exam involve 
two quite different cognitive processes. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Massari's and Rosenblum's hypothesis was 
not supported. 
Wright and Tedeschi (1975) provide a concise review 
of several other studies in which interpersonal trust was 
measured by the ITS. High trusters are: less likely to 
lie to experimenters in debriefing sessions, more trust-
worthy with peers in games, rated by their peers as more 
trustworthy, and are more trusting of experimenters, peers 
in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, and peers in a trustwalk. 
Also, contrary to popular folklore high trusters are not 
more gullible than low trusters, at least in the contexts 
of deception experiments and games with peers. 
Outside of the laboratory, are low trusters more 
suspicious than high trusters? Wright and Maggied (1975) 
used an interesting technique to answer this question. 
Two experiments were conducted at two different univer-
sities utilizing an unobtrusive, nonreactive paradigm. 
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Subjects were students from introductory psychology 
classes who scored very high or very low on the ITS, 
which was completed at the beginning of the term. A 
female assistant telephoned the selected students in the 
evening and asked if they would be willing to participate 
in a psychology experiment. In both experiments, high 
trusters asked fewer II logistics II questions (e.g. Where? 
What time?), and fewer suspicious questions (e.g. Who's 
the experimenter? Why me?) than did low trusters. In 
one of the experiments the caller closed with: "Do you 
have any questions?" Again, high trusters asked fewer 
questions. It seems, that although high trusters aren't 
more gullible (i.e. easily duped), they are less suspicious 
than low trusters. 
Hochreich (1975) explored the relationship between 
sex-role stereotypes and interpersonal trust. The author 
notes that there are differing cultural norms and expec-
tations for females and males, which leads her to hypo-
thesize that, " ••. stereotypes of the extremely masculine 
male would be ... significantly lower in trust than stereo-
types of the extremely feminine female" (p. 273). The 
results clearly supported her hypothesis. Both females 
and males see a 11 supermale 11 as being less trusting than 
a "superfemale. 11 Furthermore, females see the "super-
female" as more trusting than males do. Although subjects' 
actual trust scores diverged from their same-sex stereo-
types (i.e. males had higher trust scores than their 
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supermale stereotype scores, and females lower} , llochreich I s 
study shows that there is a sex-role stereotype, perceived 
by both sexes, concerning interpersonal trust. Unfor-
tunately, Hochreich did not test (or report} whether or 
not the actual trust scores for females and males differed 
significantly. Perhaps the author did not consider 
measuring this because of Rotter's (1967) earlier report 
of no difference between the sexes. Still, it seems·that 
another test of that assumption would have either yielded 
more convincing evidence, or raised some questions for 
further research. 
All of the researchers• work cited above apparently 
accepted Rotter's definition of interpersonal trust and 
his assumption that the ITS measures an unidimensional, 
generalized expectancy concerning the belieyeability of 
others' statements, and as such, can be a predictor of 
people's behavior in all interpersonal situations. At 
least three attempts have been made to test this assump-
tion. Each of these studies supply evidence that the ITS 
does not measure a generalized expectancy. Rather, dif-
ferent items seem to be tapping different expectancies 
(i.e. dimensions} or discrete components of trust. 
Kaplan (1973) did a factor analytic breakdown of the 
ITS which revealed three discrete factors: (1) institu-
tional trust - trust toward maJor social agents in society; 
(2) sincerity - perceived sincerity of others; and (3) 
caution - fear that people will take advantage of others. 
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To examine sex differences, Kaplan computed sub-scale 
scores for each factor by " ... summing responses to i terns 
loading above .30 on each of the three factors and 
dividing by the number of such items" (p. 14). He then 
compared the sub-scale scores of males and females, and 
found that males' scores were significantly lower than 
females' (p <.. 05) on each of the sub-scales. We may 
tentatively hypothesize, then, that not only does a 
stereotype of males being less trusting exist (Hochreich, 
1975), but also, males are actually less trusting than 
females. 
Wright and Tedeschi (1975) rather sharply criticize 
Kaplan's study on methodological grounds. For example, 
they assert that his sample size was too small, and that 
the effect of sex was confounded by not including it as 
a variable in the factor analysis. Thus, the authors set 
out to correct these "errors" and search for " ... sub-scales 
that would allow better predictions than the general 
scale in certain classes of situations involving inter-
personal trust" (p. 471). Four large samples of students 
from two different universities, at two different times, 
supplied the data. Their cross-validated analysis re-
vealed three factors also: political trust, paternal 
trust, and trust of strangers. The political trust fac-
tor seems quite similar to Kaplan's institutional trust, 
and trust of strangers may be compared to the caution 
factor. Wright and Tedeschi compared mean item response 
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scores between the factors and found the highest scores 
on the Paternal Trust factor, the lowest on trust of 
strangers, and an intermediate level of trust on the 
political trust factor. They did not provide a statis-
tical comparison of males' and females' scores. However, 
looking at the means presented in their Table 3 (p. 475), 
there do not appear to be great differences in the sexes' 
scores. 
Another research effort stemmed from the same con-
cern which the previous studies indicated, that the ITS 
is a multidimensional rather than unidimensional scale, 
and also, that Rotter's definition of interpersonal trust 
seems incongruous with at least some items on the ITS. 
Chun and Campbell (1974) utilized a cluster analysis, 
factor analysis, and other statistical techniques to 
analyze scores from the ITS, which was interspersed in a 
larger questionnaire. Four dimensions, which they labeled: 
political cynicism, interpersonal exploitation, societal 
hypocrisy, and reliable role-performance were identified. 
The authors noted that the first two dimensions resemble 
Kaplan's institutional trust and caution factors, respec-
tively. One of Chun and Campbell's statistical techniques 
revealed two marker items for the dimensions, and they 
suggest that they be used for a shorter form of the ITS. 
From their analysis the authors are led to conclude: 
... that the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale is 
multidimensional for our college sample ... However, 
multidimensionality is not a part of Rotter's 
definition thus there is an incongruence between 
his definition and measure of interpersonal 
trust. (p. 1068) 
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Although the number and labels of factors differs, 
it seems fairly safe to conclude from these three studies 
that discrete dimensions are contained in the I~S. At 
least two, specific, independent dimensions, related to 
institutional trust and caution surfaced consistently 
when analyzing ITS scores. Thus a total score may not be 
reflecting a "generalized expectancy" at all. The addi-
tion of three or four separate, specific components does 
not necessarily a general expectancy make! The findings 
of the many studies which treat the ITS as a general 
measure may be suspect. For example, a person who scores 
very low on items concerning political trust may score 
very high on trust of strangers and paternal trust. His/ 
her total score consequently will be fairly high. If we 
were to predict from that score that the individual would 
trust Jimmy Carter, we might be quite wrong! 
Wrightsman's Philosophies of Human Nature Scale: 
Theoretical Perspective and Relevant Research 
For years social scientists have told us that there 
is no such thing as "THE human nature." But Lawrence 
Wrightsman (1964) reminds us that: 
For most of us, "human nature" is a pervasive 
and useful concept. We rely on it frequently 
to justify our own behavior and the behavior 
of others. Our beliefs about it influence every-
thing from the way we bargain with a used-car 
dealer to our expectations about a nuclear war ... 
we researchers appear unaware that the average 
man believes there is and that he employs his 
philosophy of human nature in his dealings with 
others. (p. 743) 
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Wrightsman (1974) posits that the sources for the devel-
opment of our philosophies of human nature are: obser-
vation of others' behavior 1 opinions expressed by and 
traini~g received by others 1 retesting one's philosophies 
in real-life, and one's own personality. Since life 
experiences and observations differ, people's philoso-
phies of human nature should vary also. 
With these assumptions as a theoretical foundation 
Wrighbsman (1964) constructed a Likert-type scale for 
assessing philosophies of human nature. He reviewed 
historical and contemporary writings of social scien-
tists, philosophers and theologians, which revealed six 
independent dimensions as components of philosophies of 
human nature. These dimensions are continua of: trust-
worthiness, altruism, independence, strength of will and 
rationality 1 complexity of human nature, and variability 
of human nature. After item analyses of an original 120 
statements, the Philosophies of Human Nature Scale 
(henceforth 1 PHN) included 14 items for each dimension or 
sub-scale (84 total) in its final form. In terms of test-
retest reliability, coefficients for each sub-scale were 
significant (e.g. trustworthiness, .74; altruism, .83), 
and other tests revealed construct validity for each 
dimension. 
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Since the focus of this work is interpersonal trust, 
particular attention will be paid to findings related to 
the trustworthiness sub-scale of the PHN. Wrightsman (1964) 
operationally defines trustworthiness as 11 ••• the extent to 
which people are seen as moral, honest, and reliable'' 
(p. 744). The statements comprising this sub-scale cover 
a variety of situations, from general (e.g. Most people 
would tell a lie if they could gain by it.), to specific 
(e.g. Most students do not cheat when taking an exam). 
This sub-scale, as have the others, has been shown to be 
a reliable, valid measure. First, findings related to 
sex differences will be discussed. 
Due to differences in socialization and child-rearing 
practices for females and males, Wrightsman hypothesized 
that there would be differences in the sexes' views of 
human nature. He reports several studies which support 
this hypothesis (1974). Specifically, females seem to 
have a more favorable view of human nature. In Wrightsman' s 
original samples from six different universities, females 
consistently scored significantly higher on the trust-
worthiness sub-scale of the PHN. In a study spanning the 
years 1962-1971, freshmen women at one college consistently 
showed more positive attitudes on the trustworthiness sub-
scale. And sex differences in the same direction have been 
folllld for graduate students and social workers (pp. 80-83). 
There was a downward trend in scores for both men and 
women from 1962-1971, but women still perceived people as 
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more trustworthy than men did (pp. 169-171). From all of 
these findings it seems safe to conclude that women believe 
people to be more moral, honest, and reliable than men do. 
Another instrument Wrightsman constructed for measur-
ing philosophies of human nature is a bipolar rating scale 
(1974, p. 73). The trustworthiness scale has five bipolar 
adjectives: completely good vs. completely bad, religious 
vs. unreligious, honest vs. dishonest, trustworthy vs. 
untrustworthy, and trusting others vs. distrusting others. 
The bipolar scales are reported to correlate significantly 
with the Likert-type scale. Although data is not provided, 
we would expect to find similar differences between women 
and men using the bipolar sub-scale. 
Chun and Campbell (1975) were concerned with the in-
ternal structure of Wrightsman's trustworthiness sub-scale. 
They employed the identical procedures and techniques as 
they did for Rotter's ITS (Chun and Campbell, 1974). The 
authors' analyses revealed two dimensions: global morality, 
and specific acts of honesty. Both males' and females' 
scores were encompassed in these two dimensions. The mean 
scores for females were significantly higher than males on 
the global morality dimension. For the specific acts of 
honesty dimension, no significant differences were found, 
but mean scores for males were slightly higher than those 
for females. 
Thus, as with the ITS, Wrightsman's measure of trust-
worthiness has been found to be not unidimensional, but at 
least bidimensional. Studies which have utilized the 
scale as a unidimensional one, and considered total 
scores only, may have confounded results. 
Giffin's Trust Differential: 
Theoretical Perspective and Relevant Research 
15 
Kim Giffin (1967) provides another theoretical frame-
work from which interpersonal trust can be viewed. ,He 
considers the following elements to be essential for de-
scribing trusting behaviors: 
1. A person is relying upon something. 
2. This something relied upon may be an obJect, 
an event, or a person. 
3. Something is risked by the trusting person. 
4. The trusting person hopes to achieve some 
goal by taking this risk. 
5. The desired goal is not perceived as certain. 
6. The trusting person has some degree of con-
fidence in the object of his trust. (p. 104) 
Given these essential elements Giffin then derives a 
definition of interpersonal trust: 11 ••• reliance upon 
the communication behavior of another person in order to 
achive a desired but uncertain obJective in a risky sit-
uation 11 (p. 105) . 
The "Trust Paradigm11 includes degrees of interper-
sonal trust: trust of a speaker by a listener, and trust 
of a listener by a speaker; and intrapersonal trust: 
trust of oneself as a speaker, and trust of oneself as a 
listener (p. 106). Researchers have devoted a lot of 
attention to this first component, trust of a speaker by 
a listener, under the label II source credibility" in 
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public speaking situations. In an effort to measure the 
attitude of interpersonal trust (as per his definition) 
in interpersonal situations, Giffin (1968a) constructed 
the Trust Differential (henceforth, GTD). It is impor-
tant to note that unlike Rotter's and Wrightsman's scales, 
Giffin's GTD does not attempt to measure a generalized 
expectancy or unidimensional concept, but an individual's 
attitude or readiness to respond, in a trusting or ctis-
trusting manner toward a particular person or group of 
persons. 
As its name implies, the GTD is a semantic differ-
ential instrument including seven-point, bipolar rating 
scales. Two initial studies revealed that 72 items were 
discriminating and related to interpersonal trust (1968a). 
A later study (Giffin, 1968b) employing 325 students, and 
adults from ongoing groups for the sample, item analysis, 
and then factor analysis revealed 27 items to be most dis-
criminating and loading most heavily on one of three 
factors: expertness, character, and dynamism. These 
factors appear to be independent of each other. Thus, 
Giffin considers an attitude of trust to be influenced by 
perceptions of: 
1. Expertness - this may be in terms of quantity 
of relevant infonnation, degree of ability or 
skill, or validity of judgment. 
2. Reliability - Character - a characteristic 
perceived as dependability, predictability, 
or favorable intent of the trusted person. 
3. Dynamism - behavior perceived as more active 
than passive, and more open 1 or frank than 
closed or deceptive. (Giffin and Barnes, 1976, p. 46) 
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As mentioned above, the GTD, unlike the ITS and PHN, 
recognizes its multidimensionality, and allows for sep-
arate scores on the three dimensions. In determining one's 
attitude (i.e. potential for action) of interpersonal 
trust, the GTD allows us to check specific aspects of that 
attitude. A review of some relevant findings employing 
the GTD follows. 
Giffin, Heider, Groginsky, and Drake (1970) explored 
the relationship between the variables: self-concept, 
speech anxiety, social alienation, and interpersonal 
trust. Self-concept was measured by the Tennessee Self-
Concept Scale, and trust by the GTD. Expertness and 
character were significantly positively correlated with 
the combined measure of self-concept and each of the 
TSCS' sub-scales (with the exception of moral-ethical 
self and expertness). The relationship between dynamism 
and the combined scores was positive, but not significant; 
all but two of the sub-scales (personal self and moral-
ethical self) were significantly related to dynamism. 
These findings led Giffin to later hypothesize that: 
(1) A person's trust of another is a function of his/her 
own self-concept; and (2) A person with low self-concept 
will tend to trust others who give information that con-
firms his/her low self-concept, and tend to distrust 
others who give information that disconfirms it (Giffin, 
1973, pp. 300-301). 
At least two other, independent studies support those 
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hypotheses. Bormann and Shapiro (1962) report that 
students' perceived confidence in speaking is a function 
of their self-image; those low in self-concept are more 
anxious about speaking. A study conducted by Deutsch 
and Solomon (1959) found that subjects who negatively 
evaluated their own performance judged others who neg-
atively evaluated them more positively than others who 
gave them positive evaluations. Another finding of 
Wrightsman's (1964) is relevant here. One hundred females 
were sampled to test his hypothesis that those dissatis-
fied with their self-concept would possess less favorable 
views of human nature (i.e. score lower on the PHN, 
including the trustworthiness scale). The results 
supported his hypothesis. 
There is no research to date which utilizes the GTD 
to explore attitudes of interpersonal trust in same-sex 
vs. opposite-sex communication, or to see if any differences 
exist between females and males in their attitudes of 
interpersonal trust. 
Summary 
Three different approaches to the study of inter-
personal trust have been reviewed. Each approach has its 
own accompanying scale to measure trust. Some research 
conducted using each scale has been reviewed with parti-
cular attention paid to findings concerning the relation-
ship between trust and the differences between females 
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and males, and trust and self-concept. Tests of differ-
ences between females and males on the ITS and PHN have 
yielded conflicting results. The GTD has not been utilized 
to test for differences between the sexes. Research cited 
indicates an interaction between·self-concept and trust. 
Attention also has been given to work which evaluated 
and/or refined Rotter's ITS, and Wrightsman's trustworth-
iness sub-scale of the PHN. That the ITS is measurfng a 
"generalized expectancy 11 is doubtful, and the unidimension-
ality of the trustworthiness scale is questionable also. 
The Giffin Trust Differential does include three indepen-
dent dimensions, but other than Giffin's original analysis, 
no further attempts have been made to evaluate the GTD. 
Also, whereas the ITS and trustworthiness scales purport 
to measure a more global, generalized notion of trust, the 
GTD attempts to measure attitudes of interpersonal trust 
toward a specific pe~son or group. 
Purposes of the Study 
This writer was concerned not only with the communi-
cation variable of interpersonal trust, but also with its 
effects for ongoing opposite- and same-sex interaction. 
Giffin's {1973) conceptualization of interpersonal trust 
as " ... an attitude involving cognition, cathexis, and 
conation," {p. 298), and his operational definition of: 
" ... reliance upon the communication behavior of another 
person in order to achieve a desired but uncertain 
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objective in a risky situation" (Giffin, 1967, p. 105), 
provided a framework most amenable to exploring attitudes 
of interpersonal trust between the sexes, and served as 
the guide for the specific questions that were asked. 
Specifically, this study explored the following two 
questions: 
1. What are females' attitudes of interpersonal 
trust toward: a) females in general, b) males 
in general, c) their closest female friend; 
and d) their closest male friend? 
2. What are males' attitudes of interpersonal 
trust toward: a) females in general, b) males 
in general, c) their closest female friend, 
and d) their closest male friend? 
"Informal hypotheses purporting to answer these questions 
abound. In discussions of interpersonal trust between 
females and males, students are very quick to state their 
positions: "Guys aren't trustworthy, but my boyfriend 
is ! " "I trust my girlfriend, but not all women in 
general!" These are just a few individually stated 
opinions, and no evidence to date supports or refutes 
these assumptions. We simply do not know what attitudes 
of interpersonal trust females and males have for the 
same, and opposite sexes. Nor do we know which charac-
teristics most influence an attitude of interpersonal 
trust between the sexes. Perhaps the largest component 
of interpersonal trust of women for men is perceived 
expertness. In terms of men, perhaps their attitude of 
interpersonal trust toward women is primarily composed 
of perceived character attributes. It is also possible 
that differences in attitudes of interpersonal trust 
exist depending upon whether a sex group in general, or 
a closest friend of either sex is considered. 
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Prior research findings provide some indirect evi-
dence that differences in attitudes of interpersonal 
trust do exist between the sexes. For example, Sidney 
Jourard (1971) posits that self-disclosure follows an 
attitude of love and trust (p. 5), and the most consis-
tent difference he found in a series of questionnaire 
studies of self-disclosure was that women disclosed more 
about themselves than men did (p. 232). This finding 
indicates that perhaps females have greater attitudes 
of interpersonal trust than males. Another finding of 
Jourard's was a significant correlation between how 
well the subjects (both females and males) knew the tar-
get person, and the amount and type of information that 
was disclosed to him/her (p. 231). Also, Lockwood and 
Eman (:976), using a modified version of Jourard's self-
disclosure instrument, found that one of the predictor 
variables that led to a discrimination between friends 
and acquaintances was "willingness to discuss intimate 
topics." Thus, some differences in attitudes of inter-
personal trust might exist depending upon whether the 
attitude object considered is a closest male or female 
friend, or either sex in general. 
The reader will recall Giffin's (1973) hypothesis 
and the related findings that a person's trust of another 
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is a function of his/her own self-concept. In terms of 
self-concept alone, it seems that females' and males' 
self-concepts would differ due to differing socialization 
processes. This is not to say that their self-concepts 
differ in terms of high and low. As a matter of fact, 
after reviewing several studies dealing with self-esteem 
or self-concept, Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) conclude that 
there are no differences between the sexes; females 'and 
males have equally positive or negative overall self-
concepts (pp. 150-163). 
There do seem to be differences, however, in the com-
ponents of the sexes' self-concepts as perceived by men 
and women of all ages. For example, Braverman, Vogel, 
Braverman, Clarkson, and Rosenkrantz (1972) conducted a 
series of studies over a six-year period developing and 
administering a sex-role questionnaire. Attributes such 
as independence, objectivity, competitiveness, and self-
confidence comprised a "competency" cluster, which both 
females and males perceived as being male-valued. A 
"warmth and expressiveness" cluster, including the 
attributes of gentleness, tactfulness, and ability to 
express tender feelings, were perceived by both sexes as 
being female-valued items. Thus, different characteristics 
seem to comprise both sexes' views of male self-concepts 
and female self-concepts. If Giffin's hypothesis that 
"P 1 s trust of O is a function of P's self-concept" is 
correct, then we can expect differences in interpersonal 
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trust depending on both P's and 0 1 s sex. 
Let us also look again at some of the findings em-
ploying Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale, and Wrights-
man's trustworthiness scale. The reader will recall that 
although Rotter (1964) found no differences between the 
sexes in overall ITS scores, Kaplan (1973) did find that 
males' scores were significantly lower than females' scores 
on all three of the sub-scales which surfaced using factor 
analysis. Also, from Hochreich's (1975) study we know that 
in terms of stereotyped images, males are perceived as less 
trusting than females by both sexes. Wrightsman's (1964, 
1974) trustworthiness scale has consistently shown men to 
be less trusting than women. It is interesting to note 
that his conceptualization of trustworthiness includes 
the terms: "moral, honest, and reliable," all of which 
are components of Giffin's character dimension of the GTD. 
Also, Wrightsman's bipolar rating scale employs adjectives 
similar to the GTD's character dimension (e.g. good-bad, 
honest-dishonest). 
Given Wrightsman's consistent findings, it seems 
that a tenable, testable hypothesis is that females and 
males perceive females to be higher in character, as 
measured by the GTD. The results of Braverman et al. 
(1972) lead to another tentative hypothesis: that males 
will be perceived as higher on the expertness dimension, 
as measured by the GTD, than females by b?th males and 
females. These informal hypotheses seem intuitively 
correct, but the writer realizes that such speci£ic 
statements are quite premature and thus, are to be con-
sidered as highly tentative. 
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Thus, the following three main null hypotheses, and 
eight, null sub-hypotheses were tested. Three hypotheses, 
addressed specifically to the dimensions of the Giffin 
Trust Differential (i.e. expertness, character, and 
dynamism), were also tested for the second main hypothesis, 
and for each sub-hypothesis. 
I. There will be no difference between females' and 
males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust 
(on the expertness, character, and dynamism dimensions) 
toward members of the same and opposite sex. 
A. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal 
trust toward "females in general." 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of expertness when 
considering "females in general." 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of character when 
considering "females in general." 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of dynamism when con-
sidering II females in general." 
B. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal 
trust toward "males in general." 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of expertness when 
considering "males in general." 
2. There will be no difference between females• 
and males' perceptions of character when 
considering "males in general." 
3. There will be-no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of dynamism when 
considering "males in general." 
C. There will be no difference between females' and 
males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal 




1. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of expertness when 
considering their "closest female friend." 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of character when 
considering their II closest female friend. 11 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of dynamism when con-
sidering their "closest female friend. 11 
D. There will be no difference between females' and 
males' expressed at~itudes of interpersonal 
trust tO'Ward their II closest male friend. 11 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of expertness when 
considering their "closest male friend. 11 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of character when 
considering their "closest male friend. 11 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of dynamism when 
considering their "closest male friend." 
There will be no difference between expressed atti-
tudes of interpersonal. trust toward "females" versus 
"males." 
1. There will be no difference between perceptions 
of expertness toward "females" versus "males. 11 
2. There will be no difference between perceptions 
of character toward "females" versus "males .. " 
3. There will be no difference between perceptions 
of dynamism toward II females II versus "males .. " 
There will be no difference between expressed atti-
tudes of interpersonal trust (on the expertness, 
character and dynamism dimensions) toward a "closest 
friend" of both sexes versus both sexes "in general." 
E. There will be no difference between females' 
expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward 
"their closest female friend" versus "females in 
,general." 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest female friend, 11 versus II females in 
general. 11 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest female friend 11 versus 11 females in 
general .. " 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 
"closest female friend, 11 versus "females in 
general." 
F. There will be no difference between females' 
expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust 
toward their "closest male friend" versus 
"males in general." 
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1. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in · 
general." 
G. There will be no difference between males' 
expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust 
toward their "closest female friend" versus 
"females in general." 
1. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest female friend" versus "females in 
general." 
2. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest female friend" versus "females in 
general." 
3. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 
"closest female friend" versus "females in 
general." 
H. There will be no difference between males' ex-
pressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward 
their "closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
1. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
2. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
3. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 




Trust has been recognized by communication scholars 
as a variable of central importance in human relation-
ships. Its importance has also been recognized, but not 
studied empirically, in the specific context of the 
female-male relationship. The need for such research 
prompted the author to formulate specific questions.de-
' signed to explore the operation of the communication 
variable interpersonal trust in the female-male context. 
After reviewing three approaches to the study of inter-
personal trust, Giffin's conceptual framework was adopted 
as the guide for this study. "Informal" hypotheses and, 
indirect evidence from other studies led to the formula-
' 
tion of specific hypotheses to be tested. The following 
chapter presents the procedures and methodology used for 
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testing these hypotheses. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
This study was conducted in an effort to determine to 
what extent, if any, females• and males' attitudes of 
interpersonal trust toward the same- and opposite-sex 
differ. This chapter includes the procedures and metho-
dology used for testing the main null hypotheses, and null 
sub-hypotheses stated in Chapter I. 
Population for the Study 
The source of data for the study were University of 
Kansas students enrolled in the Basic Communication 
Program, Fall Semester, 1976. Participation in the study 
fulfilled the students• Experiment Participation require-
ment for the semester. A total of 104 males and 137 
females participated in the study. On the average, sub-
jects were between first and second semester students. 
The mean age of subjects was 18.9, or between 18 and 19 
years. 
Measuring Instrument 
The Giffin Trust Differential-Form E (1968b) served 
as the principle measuring instrument. As described in 
Chapter I, the GTD is a 27-item semantic differential 
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instrument, including seven-point, bipolar ratings scales. 
Nine items each comprise the expertness, character, and 
dynamism factors. At the top of each GTD was one of the 
following four attitude objects: your closest male 
friend, your closest female friend, males in general, or 
females in general. The GTD and scoring sheet are included 
in Appendix A. 
Design and Procedures 
The hypotheses to be tested called for a 2X2X2 factor-
ial design which is presented below in Table 1. The first 
variable was sex of subject - female or male. The second 
variable was sex of attitude object - female or male. The 
third variable was relationship to attitude object -












n = 25 n = 25 
n = 34 n = 33 
Female 
Closest General 
n = 26 n = 26 
n = 35 n = 33 
N = 237 
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Each subject was requested to fill out one Giffin Trust 
Differential. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
eight groups: four male groups and four female groups. 
The subJects in each group were instructed to consider one 
of the following four attitude obJects when filling out 
the GTD: your closest female friend, your closest male 
friend, females in general, or males in general. Two 
males and two females failed to fill out the GTD completely, 
leaving a total of 237 subjects. 
Given Rotter's (1967} finding of significant correla-
tions between scores on his Interpersonal Trust Scale and 
position in the family, socioeconomic level, religion, and 
religious differences between parents, it seemed appro-
priate to provide an Infonnation Sheet of demographic data 
for subjects to fill out after the GTD (see Appendix B}. 
The demographic data was later correlated with GTD scores. 
This ensured that differences found using the GTD could be 
attributed to sex related factors rather than other demo-
graphic characteristics. The information requested included: 
age, number of semesters of college attended, subjects' 
religious preference, mother's religious preference, father's 
religious preference, and subjects' position in the family. 
Finally, subjects filled out the Carrocci-McClearey 
Questionnaire (henceforth, CMQ}, a questionnaire designed 
by Kevin McClearey and the author (see Appendix C}. The 
purpose of the CMQ was to provide a straightforward indica-
tion of subjects' attitudes of interpersonal trust by 
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using a direct, self-report technique. Also, scores from 
the CMQ were later correlated with GTD scores in an attempt 
to provide some validation of subjects' expressed attitudes 
of interpersonal trust from the GTD. The CMQ includes 
four statements: 11 I trust my closest female friend, 11 "I 
trust my closest male friend, 11 11 I trust males in general, 11 
and "I trust females in general." SubJects drew an arrow 
on a 100 millimeter line to indicate the extent to which 
they "trusted" the person or group designated for each 
statement, from O (not at all) to 100 (completely). 
Statistical Treatment 
The maJor reference for computational procedures was 
StatisticalPrinciples in Experimental Design (Winer, 1971). 
All statistical tests, except where indicated, were per-
formed at the University of Kansas Computer Center. 
Each GTD was hand-scored for the factors of expert-
ness, character, and dynamism. The design called for a 
three-way analysis of variance, which was performed for 
each of the three factors, using the BMDP2V statistical 
program. The independent variables for all three analyses 
of variance were: sex of subject, sex of attitude obJect, 
and relationship to attitude object (closest or general). 
The dependent variables were subjects' expertness, charac-
ter, or dynamism scores. These analyses of variance pro-
vided the tests for the three main null hypotheses. All 
sub-hypotheses were tested by the author, who performed 
t-tests to compare the pairs of means. The author later 
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performed tests for simple effects for further analysis of 
signi cant interactions from the ANOVAls. 
To check for any relationships between subjects' atti-
tudes of interpersonal trust and demographic characteristics, 
the data from the Information Sheet was correlated with 
subJects' expertness, character, and dynamism scores. The 
Cancorr Program of the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS, 1975) provided a correlation matrix'and 
performed a test for canonical correlation between the sets 
of variables. Canonical correlation is a technique 11 ..... 
for assessing the degree of relationship between a set of 
p pre.dictor variables and a set of g_ outcome variables." 
(Harris, 1975, p. 132). In the present case the demographic 
data served as the set of predictor variables, while ex-
pertness, character, and dynamism scores served as the set 
of outcome variables. 
Threet-tests were performed to compare subjects• 
scores on the expertness, character and dynamism dimensions 
whose parents• religious preferences were the same to those 
subjects whose parents' religious preferences differed. 
In an effort to see if any relationships existed 
between subjects' expertness, character, and dynamism 
scores, and subjects' scores from the CMQ, the SPSS pro-
gram provided a matrix of Pearson Product Moment Correla-
tion Coefficients. To discern what relationships (if any) 
existed between sex of subject and their GTD and CMQ scores, 
correlation coefficients for these variables were also 
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included in this analysis. 
Finally, the BMDP2V program was employed to perform 
a 2X4 repeated measures analysis of variance of subjects' 
scores from the CMQ. The ANOVA compared female subjects 1 
scores to male subjects' scores (between groups measure). 
Also, subjects' responses to all four statements were 
compared to discern differences among scores (within group 
measure). 
Summary 
The population for the study, measuring instruments 
used, design, procedures, and statistical analysis methods 
have been described in this chapter. Chapter III will 
present the results of the data analyses. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
In this chapter the results obtained from the data 
analysis of subjects' scores on the Giffin Trust Differ-
ential will be reported. The order of presentation will 
be: (1) tests of hypotheses and sub-hypotheses utilizing 
subjects' scores from the expertness dimension; (2) tests 
of hypotheses and sub-hypotheses utilizing subjects' scores 
from the character dimension; and (3) tests of hypotheses 
and sub-hypotheses utilizing subJects' scores f~om the 
dynamism dimension. 
The results from t~e demographic data analyses will 
then be reported. Finally, the results from analyses 
utilizing subjects• scores from the CMQ will be reported. 
Before reporting the results, however, it seems appro-
priate to restate the main and sub-hypotheses that were 
tested: 
I. There will be no difference between femalesr and males' 
expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust (on the 
expertness, character, and dynamism dimensions) toward 
members of the same and opposite sex. 
A. There will be no difference between females• and 
males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust 
toward "females in general." 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
and males• perceptions of expertness when 
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considering "females in general." 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of character when con-
sidering "females in general." 
3. There will be no difference between females 1 
and males• perceptions of dynamism when con-
sidering "females in general." 
B. There will be no difference between females• and 
males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust 
toward "males in general. " 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of expertness when con-
sidering "males in general. 11 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
and males 1 perceptions of character when 
considering "males in general." 
3. There will be no difference between females 1 
and males' perceptions of dynamism when con-
sidering "males in general." 
C. There will be no difference between females' and 
males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust 
toward their "closest female friend." 
1. There' will be no difference between females 1 
and males' perceptions of expertness when 
considering their "closest female friend." 
2. There will be no difference between females 1 
and males' perceptions of character when 
considering their "closest female friend." 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of dynamism when 
considering their "closest, female friend." 
D. There will be no difference between females' and 
males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust 
toward their "closest male friend." 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of expertness when 
considering their "closest male friend." 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of character when 
considering their "closest male friend." 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
and males' perceptions of dynamism when 
considering their "closest male friend." 
II. There will be no difference between expressed attitudes 
of interpersonal trust toward "females II versus "males. 11 
l. There will be no difference between perceptions of 
expertness toward "females" versus "males." 
2. There will be no difference between perceptions of 
character toward "females" versus "males." 
36 
3. There will be no difference between perceptions of 
dynamism toward II females n versus "males. 11 
III. There will be no difference between expressed attitudes 
of interpersonal trust (on the expertness, character 
and dynamism dimensions) toward a "closest friend" of 
both sexes versus both sexes "in general." 
E. There will be no difference between females' ex-
pressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward 
"their closest female friend 11 versus "females in 
general." 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest female friend, '1 versus II females' in 
general." 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest female friend" versus "females in 
general." 
3. There will be no difference between females 1 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 
"closest female friend," versus "females in 
general." 
F. There will be no difference between females' ex-
pressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward 
their "closest male friend 11 versus "males in 
general. 11 
1. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
2. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
3. There will be no difference between females' 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
G. There will be no difference between males' ex-
pressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward 
their II closest female friend" versus II females in 
general. 11 
1. There will be no difference between males• 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest female friend" versus 11 females in 
general." 
2. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest female friend" versus "females in 
gerleral." 
3. There will be no difference between males• 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 
"closest female friend" versus nfemales in 
general." 
37 
H. There will be no difference between males 1 
expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward 
their "closest male friend" versus "males in 
general." 
1. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of expertness when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in general." 
2. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of character when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in general." 
3. There will be no difference between males' 
perceptions of dynamism when considering 
"closest male friend" versus "males in general. 11 
1) Expertness 
The following are the ,results obtained from the 
analyses utilizing subjects' scores on the expertness di-
mension of the Giffin Trust Differential. An analysis of 
variance provided the test of the three main null hypotheses 
for the expertness dimension. The results of this ANOVA are 
presented in Table 2(see next page). The analysis of var-
iance revealed that sex of subject was a significant fac-
tor· (F = 5. 96, p <. 0. 05). Thus hypothesis I was rejected .. 
The overall mean score for female subjects (X = 48.21) was 
greater than the overall mean score for male subjects 
(X = 46.10), implying that females consider people of both 
sexes to be more expert than males do. 
More specifically, the t-test results of the four 
sub-hypotheses tested (A1 , B1 , c1 , D1 ) show how female 
and male subjects differed in their perceptions of ex-
pertness when considering: females in general, males in 
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Table 2 
.ANOVA: Expertness Dimension of GTD 
Sum of 
Source Squares df Mean Square F 
1SEX 258~73462 1 258.73462 5.96326* 
SEXAO 67.873728 1 67.873728 1.56350 
RELAO 1701. 05823 1 1701.05823 39.20562** 
SEX X SEXAO 550.89917 1 550.89917 12.69700** 
SEX X RELAO 1.74268 1 1.74268 0.0.4016 
SEXAO X RELAO 27,27319 1 27.27319 0.62859 
SEX X SEXAO X RELAO 194.62769 1 194.62769 4.48574* 
Error 9935.88037 229 43.38812 
1 
SEX= Sex of Subject; SEXAO = Sex of Attitude Object: 
RELAO = Relationship to Attitude Object (closest or 
general) 
* p < 0. 05 
**p < 0. 001 
Table 3 
Comparisons Between Mean Scores for Females and Males/ 
Expertness 
Means 
Hyp. Attitude Object Males Females t 
Al Females in General 40 .. 65 47.85 -4.16** 
B1 Males in General 45.96 43.33 1.58 
C1 Closest Female Friend 47.38 50.57 -1.76* 
D1 Closest Male Friend 50.40 51.09 - .36 
* p<0.05 
* *p <. 0. 00 5 
general, closest female friend, or closest male friend. 
These results are presented in Table 3 (on page 38). 
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It can be seen from the Table that females' and males' 
perceptions of expertness when considering "females in 
general" differ significantly. That is, female subjects 
considered "females in general" to be more expert than 
did male subJects. Sub-hypothesis Ai was thus rejected. 
Likewise, females rated their "closest female friend'" 
higher than males rated their "closest female friend. 11 
Because of this significant difference, sub-hypothesis 
C1 was reJected. Sub-hypotheses B1 and D1 were accepted 
since the differences between females' and males' scores 
did not differ significantly when considering "males in 
general" or "closest male friend." The tendency of female 
subJects to consider people of both sexes to be more ex-
pert than male subjects was reversed when considering 
"males in general." For this group, male subJects had 
higher scores than female subjects, but since the dif-
ference was not significant no conclusions can be drawn 
from these results. 
The result of the test for difference in perceptions 
of expertness due to sex of attitude object was not sig-
nificant (F = 1.56). The mean scores of male and female 
subjects combined for all "male" attitude objects (closest 
and general, X = 47.695) did not significantly differ from 
males' and females' combined scores for all "female" 
attitude objects (closest and general, X = 46.615). There-
fore 1 hypothesis II - no difference between perceptions 
of expertness for "female" attitude objects vs. "male" 
attitude obJects - was accepted. 
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Howeverr the significant interaction between sex of 
subject and sex of attitude obJect (F = 12.697 1 p < 0.001) 
shows that sex of attitude obJect did have some effect on 
subJects' perceptions of expertness. A test of the sim-
ple effects of sex of subject for "male" ( closest and 
general combined) and "female" (closest and general) 
attitude objects revealed that male subJects perceive 
"males" to be significantly more expert than "females" 
(F = 23.18 1 p (0.001), and ~hat female subjects consider 
11 females" to be significantly more expert than ''males" 
(F = 5.35, p {0.05). There is an exception to this latter 
finding which can be detected by another look at the group 
means in Table 2: the mean for female subJects when con-
sidering "closest female friend" is slightly lower than 
the mean for female subjects when considering "closest 
male friend. 11 This finding appears to account for the 
significant three-way interaction (SEX X SEXAO X RELAO) 
whereas female subjects perceive "females" ("close;;t 
friend" and "in general") to be more expert than "males" 
(" closest friend" and II in general") , and "females in 
general" to be more expert than "males in general," they 
perceive "closest female friend" to be slightly less 
expert than II closest male friend. 11 
The third main factor, which was significant 
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(F = 39. 21, p <. 0. 001) , was relationship to attitude 
object. There was a significant difference between both 
male and female subjects' perceptions of expertness for 
a "closest friend" of either sex versus either sex "in 
general." Therefore, hypothesis III was rejected. 
Specifically, "closest friends" (X = 49. 86) of both sexes 
were perceived to be more expert than both sexes "in 
general" (X = 44.95) by female and male subjects. 
To determine the differences in expertness scores 
due to relationship to attitude object for female and 
male subJects separately, t-tests of the four sub-
hypotheses (E1, F1 , G1 , Hi) were performed. The results 
of these tests are provided in Table 4: 
Table 4 
Comparisons Between Mean Scores: 
"Closest" to "General"/Expertness 
Attitude ObJects 
Sex of 
1cFF Hyp-;. Subject FIG CMF MIG t 
E1 Female 50.57 47.85 1.65 
Fl Female 51.09 43.33 4.85** 
Gl Male 47.38 40.65 3.59** 
Hl Male 50.40 45.96 2.56* 
l 
CFF = Closest Female Friend; FIG= Females in General; 
CMF = Closest Male Friend; MIG= Males in General 
* p <..0.05 
**p < 0. 005 
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Male subjects perceived their "closest female friend" to 
be significantly more expert than "females in general," 
and their "closest male friend" to be significantly more 
expert than "males in general. 11 Thus sub-hypotheses G1 
and H1 were rejected. Sub-hypothesis F1 was similarly 
rejected since females perceived their "closest male 
friend" to be significantly more expert than "males in 
general." The mean of female subjects conside~ing t.heir 
"closest female friend" was higher than for those consi-
dering "females in general," but the difference between 
the means was not significant. Sub-hypothesis E1 was 
accepted. 
2} Character 
Subjects' scores from the character dimension of the 
Giffin Trust Differential served as the data for the 
second analysis of variance. The results of this ANOVA, 
which provided the test of the three main null hypotheses, 
are presented in Table 5 (see page 43}. The test of the 
first main hypothesis revealed no difference in scores due 
to sex of subject. Overall, females' and males' percep-
tions of character toward all four attitude objects dJ..d 
not differ significantly (~ = 48.96, females;~ 47.22, 
males}. Hypothesis I - no difference between females' 
and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust on the 
character dimension - was accepted. 
The t-tests between individual means for females and 
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Table 5 
ANOVA: Character Dimension of GTD 
Sum of 
Source Squares df Mean Square F 
1sEx 176.96643 1 176.96643 2.95131 
SEXAO 897.34828 1 897.34828 14.96529* 
RELAO 4322.06433 1 4322.06433 72.08009* 
SEX X SEXAO 51. 24329 1 51 .. 24329 0.85460 
SEX X RELAO 154.15100 1 154.15100 2.57081 
SEXAO X RELAO 139.78955 1 139.78955 2. 33·130 
SEX X SEXAO X RELAO 161. 80225 1 161.80225 2.69841 
Error 13731.29114 229 59.96197 
1 
SEX= Sex of SubJect; SEXAO = Sex of Attitude ObJect; 









Comparisons Between Mean Scores for 
Females and Males/Character 
Means 
Attitude Object Males Females 
Females in General 45.15 47.88 
Males in General 42.28 39.79 
Closest Female Friend 52.27 54.91 
Closest Male Friend 49.16 53. 26 
*p < 0. 025 
t 




males yielded similar results. The reader will recall 
that the four sub-hypotheses (A2 , B2 , c2 , D2) addressed 
differences between females and males toward each group 
of attitude objects. The individual means and results 
of the t-tests are displayed in Table 6 (see preceding 
page). There was one significant difference between 
means - that between females and males when considering 
their "closest male friend. 11 Female subjects perceived 
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11 closest mp.le friend" to be higher in character than did 
male subjects. Because of this significant difference, 
sub-hypothesis n2 was reJected. The other three sub-
hypotheses (A2 , B2 , c2 ) were accepted since females' and 
males' perceptions of character for "females 1.n general, 11 
"males in general, 11 and "closest female friend 11 did not 
differ significantly. From these and the ANOVA main 
effect results, it seems safe to conclude that, except 
for a 11 closest male friend, 11 females' and males' percep-
tions of character toward the same and opposite sex do 
not differ. 
However, as the analysis of variance revealed, sex 
of the attitude objects was a significant factor for both 
females' and males' cons1.derat1.ons of character (F = 14.965, 
p < 0. 001). The overall mean score for both female and 
male subjects was higher for 11 female 11 attitude objects 
( 11 closest 11 and "general," X = 50.05) than for 11 male 11 
attitude objects ( 11 closest 11 and "general, 11 X = 46.12). 
This significant difference led to the rejection of 
Hypothesis II2 • Thus, it appears that both females and 
males consider "females" to be higher in character than 
"males." 
Hypothesis III, which addressed subjects• percep-
tions of character toward a "closest friend" of both 
sexes versus both sexes "in general" was rejected 
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(F = 72.08, p(0.001). F~males and males consider their 
' "closest friends" of both sexes (4 = 52.40) to be much 
higher in character than both sexes "in general" 
(X = 43.775). 
This finding is also reflected in the results of 
the t-tests, where the means of "closest'' vs. "general 11 
were compared for female and male subjects separately. 
These results are presented in Table 7: 
Table 7 
Comparisons Between Mean Scores: 
"Closest" to "General"/Character 
Attitude Objects 
Sex of 
1cFF Hyp. Subject FIG CMF MIG t 
E2 Female 54.91 47.88 4.36* 
F2 Female 53.26 39.79 6.646* 
G2 Male 52.27 45.15 3.14* 
H2 Male 49.16 42.28 3.077* 
1 
CFF = Closest Female Friend; FIG= Females in General; 
CMF = Closest Male Friend; MIG= Males in General 
*p < 0. 005 
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All four sub-hypotheses (E 2 , F2 , G2 , Hz) were rejected due 
to significant differences between all four pairs of 
means. More specifically, both females and males perceive 
.. 
a "closest female friend" to be higher in character than 
11 females in general," and "closest male friend" to be 
higher in character than "males in general." 
There were no significant interactions between the 
factors for the character dimension. Therefore, ali 
differences in subjects' scores can be attributed either 
to sex of attitude object ("females" rat.ed higher), or 
relationship to attitude object ( "clos,ast" rated higher) .. 
3) Dynamism 
The following results are those obtained utilizing 
subJects' scores from the dynamism dimension of the Giffin 
Trust Differential. The three main null hypotheses were 
tested through the use of the analysis of variance. Table 
8 provides the results obtained from this analysis. The 
first main null hypothesis was rejected since sex of sub-
ject proved to be a significant factor (F 4.55, p < 0.05). 
The signi cant difference between female and male sub-
jects' perceptions of dynamism toward members of the same 
and opposite sex is reflected in the overall mean scores. 
Female subjects' mean score (X = 45.61) was higher than 
male subjects' mean score {X = 43.61). The conclusion 
is that, overall, females perceive people to be more 











































12. 0'5569 ** 
1.25747 
SEX= Sex of Subject; SEXAO = Sex of Attitude ObJect; 
RELAO = Relationship to Attitude Object (nclose" or 
"general") 
* p(0.05 
**p < 0. 001 
Table 9 
Comparisons Between Mean Scores for 
Females and Males/Dynamism 
Hyp. Attitude Object 
A3 Females in General 
B3 Males in General 
c3 Closest Female Friend 
D3 Closest Male Friend 


















This difference between females and males is reflected 
somewhat in the individual means for each group of sub-
jects. These means and the results from the t-tests com-
paring the pairs of means are presented in Table 9 (see 
preceding page) . As the Table shows, except for "males 
in general," the means for female subJects are higher 
than the means for male subjects. Of the four sub-
hypotheses tested, however, only A3 - no difference· 
between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when 
considering "females in general" - was rejected. Males' 
and females' mean scores for "males in general" ( sub-
hypothesis B3 ) were nearly identical, which led to the 
conclusion that this group's level of dynamism is per-
ceived quite similarly by both sexes. The last two 
sub-hypotheses (C3 and n3), concerning "closest female 
friend" and "closest male f:i;-iend" were accepted also, 
' since the differences between these pairs of means were 
not significant. 
Hypothesis 113 was reJected due to the significant 
difference found for female and male subjects' perceptions 
of dynamism toward "female" attitude objects ("closest" 
and "general") versus "male" attitude objects (" closest" 
and "general" F= 22.57, p'(0.001). The overall mean 
score for those females and males who considered "male" 
attitude obJects (X = 46.83) was higher than the overall 
mean score :Eor those who considered "female II attitude 
objects (X = 42.39). Thus, both females and males 
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percei. ve "males" to be more dynamic than II females. 11 
The test of the third main null hypothesis revealed 
a significant difference due to relationship to attitude 
object (F = 21. 96, p <. 0. 001) . Combining female and male 
subJects' scores for dynamism, the mean score for a 
"closest friend" of both sexes (X = 46. 80) was higher 
than the mean score for both sexes "in general" (X = 42.42). 
This result led to the rejection of Hypothesis III,'and 
the conclusion that both females and males perceive their 
"closest friends" to be more dynamic than both sexes "in 
general." There was an exception, however, as reflected 
when the pairs of means for females and mal~s were analyzed 
separately to test the four sub-hypotheses (E 3 , F 3 , G3 , 
H3). These means and the accompanying t-ratios are pre-




Comparisons Between Mean Scores: 
























CFF = Closest Female Friend; FIG Females in General; 
CMF = Closest Male Friend; MIG= Males in General 
*p < 0. 00 5 
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When comparing the means for male subjects who considered 
their "closest male friend," to those males who considered 
"males in general" (sub-hypothesis H3), we find no signi-
ficant difference. Apparently, males perceive "males in 
general" to be no less dynamic than their "closest male 
friend. 11 The mean for "males in general" is actually 
slightly higher than the mean for "closest male friend." 
Although the mean for female subjects who considered 
"closest male friend" is somewhat higher than for those 
who considered "males in general," the difference was 
not significant. Thus, sub-hypothesis F 3 was accepted 
also. A "closest female friend" was considered to be 
more dynamic than "females in general" by groups of 
both female and male subjects. Due to these significant 
differences, sub-hypotheses E3 and G3 were rejected. 
The significant interaction between sex of attitude 
object and relationship to attitude obJect (F = 12.05, 
p (0.001) further substantiates the above conclusions. 
Disregarding sex of subject, the combined means are pre-
sented in Table 11 (see page 51). It can be seen from 
this Table that "females in general 11 are perceived to be 
the least dynamic of all four groups. The test for 
simple effects revealed that the differentiation between 
"closest male friend II and "males in general 11 (F = 1. 4 8) 
wasn't nearly as great as that between "closest female 
friend" and "females in general 11 (F = 6 6. 5 8, p ( 0. 001) . 
The finding that "females in general" are considered to 
TABLE 11 
Combined Means: Sex of Attitude ObJect 





*p<. 0. 001 
[Relationship to Attitude ObJectj 
"Closest Friend" 
9 4. 79 
92.40 







be the least dynamic also further explains the signifi-
cant difference found in the test of Hypothesis rr 3 , where 
11 females II were perceived to be less dynamic than "males." 
4) Demographic Data Analyses 
The test for canonical correlation between the set 
of demographic data and the set of GTD scores was not sig-
nificant at the .05 level <p = .21132, eigenvalue= .04465, 
p ( • 653) . Therefore, no meaningful linear combination of 
the demographic data was derived for prediction of crite-
rion scores (expertness, character, and dynamism scores). 
It appears that age, number of semesters of college at-
tended, religious preference, parents' religious prefer-
ences, and position in the family bear no relationslup to 
subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust from 
the GTD. 
The mean expertness, character, and dynamism scores 
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for subjects' whose parents held the same religious 
preference were compared to those whose parents' reli-
gious preferences differed. The results of these t-tests 
are presented in Table 12: 
Table 12 
Comparisons: Same Religious Preference 
vs. Different Religious Preferences 
2-tailed 
Dimension lGroup N Mean t Probability 
Expertness 1 211 47.9336 3.79 0.000* 
2 29 42.5862 
Character 1 211 48.9905 3.18 0.002* 
2 29 43.2759 
Dynamism 1 211 45.1280 2.07 0.039* 
2 28 41.8571 
1 
Group 1 = Parents' religious preference same; Group 2 = 
Parents' religious preferences different 
*=significant 
For all three dimensions, subjects with parents who differ 
in religious preference had scores that were significantly 
lower than subJects with parents who have the same reli-
gious preference. Of the 29 subjects' whose parents' 
religious preferences differed, 16 were males and 13 were 
females. Since these cases were so few, no trends con-
cerning sex of subject or attitude object considered 
could be discerned. The general conclusion that can be 
reached, however, is that expressed attitudes of inter-
personal trust on the three dimensions are lower for 
those whose parents have differing religious preferences. 
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5) Results Utilizing CMQ 
As explained in Chapter II, subjects; expertness, 
character, and dynamism scores were correlated with sub-
jects' scores from the CMQ. Each subJect had four 
separate scores from the CMQ, ranging from Oto 100. 
These scores were generated from subjects' responses to 
the four statements: "I trust my closest female friend, 11 
11 I trust my closest male friend," "I trust males in 
general," and "I trust 1 females in general." Table 13 
provides the Pearson correlation coefficients obtained: 
Table 13 
Correlation Coefficients: 
GTD and CMQ Scores 
CMQ 
GTD lcFF CMF MIG FIG 
Expertness .0626 .0687 .0669 .0765 
2s=.167 s=.144 s=.150 s=.118 
Character .2491* . 0 893 .1372 * .2142* 
s=. 001 s=.084 s=. 017 s=.001 
Dynamism .1103* -.001 .0652 .1305* 
s=.044 s=.494 s=.157 s=.022 
1 
CFF = C~osest Female Friend; CMF = Closest Male Friend; 
MIG= Males in General; FIG= Females in General 
2 
s = level of significance. 
*=significant correlation 
The correlations were not very high. Subjects' 
scores from the expertness dimension did not correlate 
significantly with any of the groups of scores from the 
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CMQ. Scores from the character dimension did correlate 
significantly with subjects' expressed amount of "trust" 
on the CMQ toward: 11 closest female friend," •~males in 
general," and "females in general." The two other sig-
nificant correlations were between dynamism scores from 
the GTD and scores for "closest female friend" and 
"females in general" from the CMQ. Thus, there appears 
to be some relationship between subJects' expressed 
attitudes of interpersonal trust from the Giffin Trust 
Differential and their responses to the straightforward 
statements on the CMQ concerning "trust" toward members 
of the same and opposite-sex, but this relationship was 
not a particularly strong one. These results, as al] 
others, will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
In Table 14 the Pearson correlation coefficients 
between GTD scores and sex of subject, and CMQ scores 
and sex of subject are presented: 
Table 14 
Correlation Coefficients: GTD, 
CMQ Scores and Sex of SubJect 
GTD CMQ 
C D CMF MIG FIG 
Sex of .1161* .0736 .1630* .1083* -.0113 -.0256 .0946 
Subject3s=.036 s=.128 s=.006 s=.047 s=.431 s=.346 s=.072 
1E = Expertness; C = Character; D = Dynamism 
2cFF = Closest Female Friend; CMF Closest Male Friend 
MIG= Males in General; FIG= Females in General 
3s = level of significance 
*=significant correlations 
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As the Table shows, the correlations were rather low 
here, also. However, there was a significant relation-
ship between sex of subject and expertness scores, and 
sex of subject and dynamism scores. The reader will 
recall that the analyses of variance revealed a signi-
ficant difference between females' and males' perceptions 
of expertness and dynamism toward members of the same 
and opposite sex, but no significant difference between 
females' and males' perceptions of character. Those 
findings correspond with the significant correlations 
found here for expertness and dynamism, and the lack of 
a significant relationship for character. 
Only one significant correlation was found between 
CMQ scores and sex of subJect. That is, a significant 
relationship was found between sex of subject and 
"closest female friend, 11 but not for the other groups 
from the CMQ. Overall, there does not appear to be a 
strong relationship between subjects' sex and their re-
sponses to the statements on the CMQ. 
The above conclusion is further substantiated by the 
results of the repeated measures analysis of variance, 
which utilized subjects' scores from the CMQ to check 
for differences between females and males toward: "a 
closest female friend," "a closest male friend, 11 "males 
in general," and "females in general." These results 
appear in Table 15. Female and male subJects 1 scores 
Table 15 
Repeated Measures ANOVA: CMQ Scores 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square 
Between Groups-S 
(Females vs. Males) 465,. 68164 1 




( CFF vs • CMF vs . 156333.21484 3 52111.07178 
MIG vs. FIG) 






* 240 subjects filled out the CMQ completely 
**p,<. 0. 001 
Table 16 
Mean Scores from CMQ 
Sex of Subject 
Attitude Object 
Closest Female Friend 
Closest Male Friend 
Males in General 

















did not differ significantly, (F = .81646). Thus 1 sex 
of subject was not a significant determinant of self-
reported amounts of "trust" toward a "closest friend" 
of both sexes, and both sexes "in general." There was, 
however, a significant difference within subjects' 
responses to the CMQ statements (F = 226.645, p( 0.001). 
Table 16 presents the means for each group (preceding 
page). As the Table shows 1 the means for "closest female 
friend" and "closest male friend" are much higher than 
the means for "males in general" and II females in general." 
This difference appears to account for the significant 
within subject difference. Both females and males reported 
that they "trust" a "closest friend" of both sexes more 
than both sexes "in general." 
The mean score for females considering "closest 
female friend" was higher than the mean score for males. 
At-test comparing these means showed this difference to 
be significant (t = 1.68, p<.OS). This appears to account 
for the significant relationship found between sex of 
subject and "closest female friend" (see Table 13) 1 and 
implies that females "trust" their "closest female friend" 
more than males do. 
Summary 
The results from all data analyses have been re-
ported in this chapter. Among the main significant 
findings from subJects' scores on the GTD are the fol-
lowing: Females' and males' perceptions of expertness 
and dynamism differed.overall, with female subJects' 
perceptions of others (i.e. scores) higher than male 
subjects' perceptions of others for both dimensions. 
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Both sexes perceived "female" attitude objects ("closest" 
and II in general") as higher in character than "male" 
attitude objects ("closest" and "in general"), and "male" 
attitude objects were perceived as more dynamic than 
"female" attitude objects by both sexes. Females and 
males perceived a "closest friend" of both sexes to 
be more expert, more dynamic, and higher in character 
than both sexes "in general." 
Another significant finding was the interaction on 
the expertness dimension between sex of subject and sex 
of attitude object, where it was revealed that male sub-
jects perceived "males" to be more expert than "females," 
and female subjects perceived "females" to be more expert 
than "males." Finally, a significant interaction between 
sex of attitude obJect and relationship to attitude ob-
Ject was found for the dynamism dimension. Further ana-
lysis revealed that this interaction was due to almost 
no differentiation in females' and males' combined scores 
between "closest male friend" and "males in general," but 
a great differentiation between "closest female friend" 
and "females in general," with the latter being rated as 
least dynamic of all four groups. 
No relationship was found between subjects' scores 
on the GTD and subjects' demographic characteristics~ 
However, subjects whose parents' religious preferences 
differed had significantly lower scores (i.e. rated 
others lower) on all three dimensions of the GTD than 
subjects' whose parents held the same religious pre-
ference. Sex of subject was significantly related to 
scores on the expertness and dynamism dimensions of ·the 
GTD, and also related to subjects 1 reported 1'trust" for 
a "closest female friend" on the CMQ. 
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Tests for correlations between GTD and CMQ scores 
revealed the following significant relationships: those 
between subjects' expressed "trust" on the CMQ toward a 
"closest female friend," "males in general," and II females 
in general," and subjects scores on the character dimen-
sion of the GTD; and between subjects expressed "trust11 
on the CMQ toward a "closest female friend" and "females 
in general," and the dynamism dimension of the GTD. 
A repeated measures ANOVA of subjects' scores from 
the CMQ revealed no difference between females' and males' 
scores overall. Within subjects, however a higher level 
of "trust" was expressed toward "closest friends" of both 
sexes than toward both sexes "in general." 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Chapter III revealed the many interesting results 
of this study. The findings of major interest, of course, 
are those related to subjects' expressed attitudes of 
interpersonal trust as per the expertness, character, and 
dynamism dimensions of the Giffin Trust Differential. 
These results will be discussed first, followed by a dis-
cussion of demographic data results. Then results from 
the CMQ measure of trust will be discussed. The limita-
tions of this study, implications, and suggestions for 
future research will be addressed in the final portions 
of the chapter. 
Attitudes of Interpersonal Trust 
The significant main effect due to sex of subject on 
the expertness dimension led to the conclusion that, 
overall, females perceive people of both sexes to be more 
expert than males do. When females' and males' scores 
were compared for all four attitude obJects, this finding 
was further substantiated by the significantly higher 
mean score for females when considering females ("closest 
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friend" and "in general 11 ) , and the higher but nonsignifi-
cant mean score ;for "closest male friend. n The trend was 
reversed, however, for "males in general, 11 where male 
subjects had slightly higher mean scores than females. 
It appears, then, that the significant difference can be 
attributed mainly to females' considering females to be 
more expert than males consider females to be. 
Based on previous research and socialization processes 
in our culture, the author had speculated earlier that 
males might be seen as more expert than females. However, 
in this study neither males nor females were perceived to 
be more or less expert overall by both sexes. Apparently, 
a stereotyped image of males being the experts does not 
exist for this group of university students. The signifi-
cant interaction between sex of subJect and sex of atti-
tude object further explains this finding. It was re-
vealed that men consider males to be more expert than fe-
males, and women consider females to be more expert than 
males. Thus, it seems that in matters requiring know-
ledge, intelligence, experience, etc., males and females 
prefer to turn to members of their own sex. 
Overall, character of both sexes was not perceived 
differently by the females and males who participated in 
this study - sex of subject was not a significant factor. 
The t-tests revealed one exception, however. Females 
consider their "closest male friend" to be higher in 
character than males do. The most interesting finding 
from subjects' scores on the character dimension was that 
females were rated higher than males by both females 
and males. The adjectives from this dimension include: 
kind, sincere, moral, nice, pa~ient, and honest; both 
sexes perceive females to be the chief possessors of 
these qualities. 
Wrightsman's (1974) conceptualization of "trust" 
closely resembles Giffin's conceptualization of the 
character component of an attitude of interpersonal' 
trust. In his studies, Wrightsman has consistently 
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found females to be more trusting than males. Therefore, 
given Wrightsman's findings and those from the present 
study, we can conclude that females are more inclined to 
trust others and that other females and males recognize 
this characteristic when asked to give their perceptions 
of females. 
In relation to these findings it seems appropriate to 
point out that the items comprising the character dimen-
sion of the GTD are affect-oriented characteristics that 
usually surface in communication when operating on the 
level of feelings. Females in our society are encouraged 
and allowed to express their feelings much more so than 
males. Males may be as sincere, honest, kind, moral, etc. 
as females, but because they display their emotions less 
frequently than females (especially toward other males, 
who rated "closest male friend" lower on this component 
than females did), others do not get the opportunity to 
see these qualities in males. 
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The first conclusion drawn from subjects• scores on 
the dynamism dimension is that overall, females perceive 
people to be more dynamic than males do. There was al-
most no difference, however, between females' and males• 
perceptions of dynamism for "males in general," who we.re 
rated much higher than "females in general'' by both sexes. 
In fact, overall, males were perceived by both sexes as 
being more dynamic than females. The interaction between 
sex of attitude object and relationship to attitude ob-
ject revealed that the difference in subjects' perceptions 
of dynamism for a "closest male friend" compared to "males 
in general" was minimal, whereas the differentiation be-
tween "closest female friend" and "females in general" was 
very great. "Females in general" were perceived as much 
less dynamic than any of the other three groups. The 
stereotypic image of .males being active, aggressive, bold, 
extroverted, energetic, etc. (all components of the dyna-
mism dimension), and females being passive, unaggressive, 
timid, introverted, reserved, etc. still exists for 
college-age students of both sexes. These findings cor-
roborate those of Chafetz' informal research (1974) and 
the series of studies conducted by Braverman et al. (1972). 
The stereotype of the passive, unaggressive female does 
not pervade people's perceptions of a "closest female 
friend," however. 
One finding that consistently emerged for all three 
dimensions was that "closest friends" of both sexes we;re 
64 
rated higher than both sexes "in general." Both men and 
women perceive their closest friends to be more expert, 
more dynamic, and higher in character than males or fe-
males in general (with the exception noted above for 
males considering "closest male friend 11 vs. "males in 
general"). As Jourard (1971) and Lockwood and Eman (1976) 
have discovered, close friends are more apt to discuss 
intimate topics, and this type of self-disclosure follows 
an attitude bf trust between the individuals. Thus, it 
seems logical that subjects would express a greater amount 
of trust toward a specific, close friend than they would 
toward a group of males or females in general. 
Demographic Characteristics 
The test for canonical correlation between the demo-
graphic data obtained from the Information Sheets and 
subJects' expertness, character and dynamism scores was 
not significant. Therefore, it appears that age, number 
of semesters of college attended, religious preference, 
parents' religious preference, position in the family, 
and number of children in the family bear no relationship 
to subJects' attitudes of interpersonal trust as expressed 
on the GTD. 
The reader will recall the ANOVA results which showed 
a significant difference in perceptions of expertness and 
dynamism due to sex of subject. Also, both male and fe-
male subjects' perceptions of character and dynamism 
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differed due to the sex of the attitude object considered. 
These findings were further substantiated by the signifi-
cant (albeit low) correlations found between sex of sub-
ject and expertness, and sex of subject and dynamism. 
Thus, we can conclude that differences in subjects' ex-
pressed attitudes of interpersonal trust were mainly due 
to sex-related factors, either sex of subject or sex of 
attitude object, and not due to age, birth order, or· other 
demographic characteristics. 
Although the test for canonical correlation revealed 
no relationship between subjects' scores on the GTD and 
subjects' mother's religious preference or father's 
religious preference, later t-tests showed that these demo-
graphic characteristics did have some bearing on subjects' 
expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust. Specifically, 
those subjects whose parents' religious preferences 
differed expressed less trusting attitudes on all three 
GTD dimensions than those subjects whose parents held the 
same religious preferences. Since such a small number of 
subjects indicated religious differences between their 
parents (n = 29), no trends could be discerned for attitudes 
toward closest friends of both sexes or both sexes in 
general. Still, these results concur with Rotter's (1967) 
earlier findings that students whose parents' religions 
differed were less trusting than those whose parents' re-




As mentioned in Chapter II, the CMQ was designed to 
provide a straightforward indication of subjects' atti-
tudes of interpersonal trust toward the same and opposite 
sex via a direct, self-report technique. According to 
the results of the ANOVA utilizing subjects' scores from 
the CMQ, both female and male subJects indicated that 
they trusted closest friends of both sexes much more than 
both sexes in general, which is consistent with the 
findings from the GTDD 
Attitudes of interpersonal trust did not differ be-
tween the sexes overall as measured by the CMQ. Females 
did, however, indicate that they trusted their "closest 
female friend" more than males did. In fact, the one 
significant correlation between CMQ scores and sex of 
subJect was that between scores for "closest female friend" 
and sex of subJect. 
These results are somewhat contradictory to those ob-
tained from the GTD, where females and males did differ in 
their perceptions of expertness and dynamism. There are 
several potential explanations for this discrepancy. First, 
subjects may have used a set response for "closest friend" 
of both sexes, and a different set response for both sexes 
"in general." Or, it could be that, on a straightforward 
instrument such as the CMQ, subjects were not willing to 
admit differences in attitudes of trust toward members of 
the same and opposite sex - they may have been attempting 
67 
to appear consistent or socially aware. The GTD, on the 
other hand, may have revealed the differences that ac-
tually exist between the sexes in attitudes of inter-
personal trust. It is also possible that expertness and 
dynamism are not components of the construct 11 trust" for 
these subjects. 
It will be recalled that a second purpose for in-
cluding the CMQ after subjects had filled out the GTb 
was to provide some validation for subjects 1 expressed 
attitudes of interpersonal trust from the GTD. Signifi-
cant correlations were found to exist between: dynamism 
scores from the GTD and CMQ scores for "closest female 
friend" and "females in general; and character scores 
from the GTD and CMQ scores for "closest female friend," 
"males in general," and 11 femaJ:es in general." Thus, the 
last explanation considered above appears to be unlikely 
since there were some relationships between GTD and CMQ 
scores. These relationships (between CMQ scores and scores 
for the character dimension of the GTD) imply that the word 
"trust" as it appeared on the CMQ, may have connotated 
character for these subjects. It should be pointed out 
that "trust" was undefined in the statments on the CMQ. 
We have no way of knowing, therefore, whether the word 
had similar or dissimilar connotations for subjects. 
Finally, it is recognized that the CMQ is a crude measuring 
instrument that was never used before, and so could be 
of limited reliability and validity. 
Implications of the Study 
One of the most significant findings of this study 
is the fact that males are not the experts as far as 
females are concerned. It appears that some changes in 
68 
our society have taken place recently since, historically, 
males rather than females have been considered to be more 
knowledgeable, logical, scholarly, experienced, etc., 
especially by females. The results of this study suggest 
that presently females would rather turn to other females 
instead of males for help in matters requiring some ex-
pertise. Apparently, females are gaining more confidence 
in their own sex, and this newly-found female credibility 
may be a direct result of the feminist movement. For the 
female-male,relationship, the implication is that the 
female no longer depends upon the male to be more educated 
and knowledgeable than she. This may be a reflection of a 
change in the old stereotypic male "breadwinner" role. 
The findings here also imply that in an intimate 
female-male relationship, the female does not necessarily 
play a passive, timid role. Males (and females) still 
consider females in general to be less dynamic (i.e., 
active, aggressive, bold, etc.) than males, but when it 
comes to a closest female friend, she is considered to be 
almost as dynamic as males by both sexes. 
The finding that both sexes consider females ~o be 
more sincere, honest, patient, moral, etc. than males 
implies that some sex-role stereotypes are still operant 
, 
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in communication between the sexes, especially from the 
males' point of view. Females find their closest male 
friend's character to be almost as high as their closest 
female friend, but this is not the case for males, who 
apparently consider their closest male friend to be much 
less sincere, honest, etc. than their closest female 
friend. 
Thus, the results of this study imply that some pro-
gress has been made in terms of reducing the number and 
pervasiveness of sex role stereotypes. At the same time, 
it is clear that females and males either differed in their 
perceptions of the dimensions of trust for the sexes, or 
both sexes perceived differences between the sexes. We 
can conclude that the variable of interpersonal trust 
operat~s differently for same-sex communication than it 
does for opposite-sex communication. 
Limitations of the Study 
It should be noted that the subjects for this study 
were a very homogeneous group. All subjects were Uni-
versity of Kansas students, most of whom were Freshmen 
between 18 and 20 years of age. Therefore, we cannot be 
sure that the results and conclusions reached here would 
be the same for·these subjects as they become upper-
classmen. non-students of the same aqe, older women and 
men, or women and men from a different geographic loca-
tion. Also, there is the possibility that one, five, or 
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ten years hence, attitudes of interpersonal trust between 
the sexes may change as the mores and norms in our society 
evolve, and hopefully as sex role stereotypes diminish 
further. 
All results from analyses utilizing the CMQ should 
be regarded as tentative. The limitations of this instru-
ment are: 1) it had no previous use nor tests for relia-
bility and validity; and 2) 11 trust 11 was undefined as it 
appeared on the questionnaire. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
In light of the above-mentioned limitations to this 
study, a most appropriate suggestion is that future study 
be undertaken to determine if the findings herein are 
applicable to different age groups, and people of varying 
backgrounds and sub-cultures. 
Two separate investigations (Rotter's and the pre-
sent) utilizing different conceptualizations of trust 
and different measuring instruments, have found people 
whose parents' religions differed to be less trusting and 
to hold less trusting attitudes toward others. No ex-
planation presently exists for these findings and future 
investigation into this area seems clearly warranted. 
Future studies of this nature that attempt to pro-
vide a straightforward measure of trust should provide 
an operational definition of trust before asking subjects 
to express their attitudes of trust for different persons 
or groups. This would insure that subjects have the 
same construct in mind while responding, and that any 
differences found could be attributed to subjects' 
differing attitudes of trust as defined - not different 
definitions of trust. 
It has been proven in this study that the female 
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and male subjects had some differing attitudes of inter-
personal trust toward the same and opposite sex, and that 
both females and males perceive some differences between 
the sexes in terms of expertness, character, and dynamism. 
Further research attempts could be made to discern how 
these attitudinal differences operate behaviorally in 
specific same-sex or opposite-sex communication situations. 
For example, attitudes of interpersonal trust could be 
determined by administering the Giffin Trust Differential 
in a manner identical or similar to the procedures used 
in this study. Then, subjects could be presented with 
specific, risky situations that would require some type 
of trusting behavior on their part, and asked to choose 
between a female or male friend as the person they would 
trust. Subjects' choices in these situations could then 
be compared to their GTD scores to see if expressed 
attitudes of interpersonal trust match behavioral choices. 
The types of studies mentioned above would also 
provide further tests of validity for the Giffin Trust 
Differential. Given direct relationships between subjects' 
responses to straightforward statements or their choices 
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in different risky situations and attitudes of inter-
personal trust as expressed on the GTD, we would be more 
certain that the expertness, character, and dynamism 
dimensions are actually components of attitudes of inter-
personal trust. This study provides some evidence that 
they are, but further research would allow us to be more 
certain. 
Summary 
The results obtained from this study have been dis-
cussed in this chapter. It has been concluded on the basis 
of the subjects studied that: 1) Females differ from males 
in perceptions of expertness and dynamism, and that fe-
males and males perceive differences between the sexes in 
terms of character and dynamism. 2) Demographic charac-
teristics, such as age, college level, etc., are not re-
lated to subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal 
trust. 3) Results obtained from the CMQ instrument should 
be regarded as tentative. 4) There appear to be implica-
tions for the operation of trust as a variable in communi-
cation between the sexes. 5) The primary limitation of 
this study is the homogeneity of the students who partici-
pated. 6) Based on the results of this investigation, 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTIONS 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to detennine your 
attitude toward a specific other person or members of 
a specified group. Fill out all of the following items 
with this one person or group in mind (as designated at 
the top of the page that follows). 
On the following page you will find a series of bipolar 
scales. You are to describe the person or group desig-
nated at the top of the page in terms of intervals on 
these scales. Please make your responses in tenns of 
what these scales mean to you. 
Here is,how you are to use these scales: 
If you feel that the person (or group) you are describing 
is very closely related to one end of the scale, you 
should place your check mark as follows: 
fair: X: . . . . . . . . . . -------: unfair 
If you feel that this person (or group) is quite closely 
related to one or the other end of the scale (but not 
extremely), you should place your check mark as follows: 
strong: : X: . . . . . . . . ------- weak 
If this person (or group) seems only slightly related to 
one side as opposed to the other side but is not really 
neutral, then you should check as follows: 
active:_:_:_:_:_!:_:_: passive 
The direction toward which you check, of course, depends 
upon which of the two ends of the scale seem most char-
acteristic of the person (or group) you're judging. If 
you consider the person (or group) to be neutral on the 
scale, both sides of the scale equally associated with 
the concept, then you should place your check mark in the 
middle interval: · 
safe: . -- : X: . . . . -----: dangerous 
IMPORT.At.~T: 1) Place your check marks in the middle of 
the spaces, not on the boundaries: 
This: Not this: 
: : : X: : : X -------
2) Be sure to check every scale--do not . 
omit any. 
3) Never put more than one check mark on 
a single scale. 
2 
Work at fairly high speed through this questionnaire. Do 
not worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your 
first impression, the immediate "feelings" about the items, 
that we want. On the other hand, please do not be care-
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SCORING KEY FOR 
GIFFIN TRUST DIFFERENTIAL (GTD-Form E) 
The following nine items are collected to score the factor 
of expertness and are tallied as indicated: 
1. Scholarly - Unscholarly (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
3. Unknowledgeable - Knowledgeable (1,2,3,4,5,6,7}. 
9. Expert - Ignorant (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
13. Uninformed - Informed (1,2,3,4,5,6,7}. 
14. Trained - Untrained (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
16. Inexperienced - Experienced (1,2,3,4,5,6,7). 
17. Educated - Uneducated (7,6,5,4,3,2,l). 
24. Intelligent - U~intelligent (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
25. Illogical - Logical (1,2,3,4,5,6,7). 
The following nine items are collected to score the factor 
of character (reliability plus intentions} and are tallied 
as indicated: 
2. Disrespectful - Respectful (1,2,3,4,5,6,7). 
4. Kind - Cruel (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
11. Dishonest - Honest (1,2,3,4,5,6,7). 
15. Good - Bad (7,6,5,4,3,2,1}. 
20. Selfish - Unselfish (l ,2,3,4,5,6,7). 
21. Sincere - Insincere (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
22. Immoral - Moral (1,2,3,4,5,6,7}. 
23. Patient - Impatient (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
26. Awful - Nice (1,2,3,4,5,6,7}. 
The following nine items are collected to score the factor 
of dynamism (activeness and frankness} and are tallied 
as indicated. 
5. Emphatic - Hesitant (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
6 . P ass i ve - Active ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7) 
7. Fast - Slow (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
8. Meek - Aggressive (1,2,3,4,5,6,7). 
10. Bold - Timid (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
12. Aggressive - Unaggressive (7,6,5,4,3,2,1) 
18. Introverted - Extroverted (1,2,3,4,5,6,7}. 
19. Energetic - Tired (7,6,5,4,3,2,1). 
27. Reserved - Frank (1,2,3,4,5,6,7). 
APPENDIX B 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Please fill out this information sheet with the appro 
priate responses. As you can see, your name is not 
requested. Therefore, all information obtained from 
this sheet will be anonymous and confidential. 
1) Sex 
2) Age 
3) Number of Semesters of College attended 







5) Father's religious preference: 
(choose one from Number 4) 
6) Mother's religious preference: 
(choose one from Number 4) 
7) Your position in family: 1st 
(check one) 
; 2nd __ ; 3rd 
5th ; Other 
8) Number of children in your family 
; 4th i 
APPENDIX C 
CMQ 
Draw an arrow on the following lines to indicate the 
extent to which you trust the person or group of persons 
indicated. 
For example, if the person indicated is your mother, and 





Remember, use an arrow to indicate your answer. 
1. I trust 
Not at 
all 
2. I trust 
Not at 
all 
3. I trust 
Not at 
all 
4. I trust 
Not at 
all 
my closest female friend: 
0 
my closest male friend: 
0 
males in general: 
0 
females in general: 
0 
Completely 
100 
Completely 
100 
Completely 
100 
Completely 
100 
